### U.S. Department of Homeland Security

# SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY DIRECTORATE

Face Recognition Scenario testing, performance, and fairness



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## **Technology, Scenario, and Operational Testing**

#### **Technology Testing:**

- Centered around a technology,
- Focused on a specific system component,
- Re-use of biometric datasets,
- Larger sample size.
- Answers questions about how technologies advance or perform relative to each other.
- Answers questions about the limits of a technology's performance.
- E.g. What is the minimum false match rate achievable by face recognition technology?

#### **Scenario Testing:**

- Centered around a use-case,
- Full multi-component biometric system,
- Gathering new biometric samples,
- Robust experimental control.
- Answers questions about how technology performs for an intended use.
- Answers questions about the suitability of a system for an intended use.
- Answers questions regarding demographic performance that cannot be answered through operational testing (E.g. performance across race categories or skin tones)
- E.g. How will face recognition perform in a high-throughput unattended scenario?

#### **Operational Testing:**

- Centered around a specific environment,
- Specific biometric system implementation,
- New data collected in the course of operational use,
- Little experimental control.
- Answers questions about how technology performs within the specific operational environment and with specific users.
- Answers questions regarding whether the technology meets specific operational performance benchmarks.
- E.g. Is the face recognition system meeting organizational performance objectives?



## Past Biometric Technology Rallies



2018 Rally assessed acquisition systems



2019 Rally assessed acquisition systems *and* matching systems



2020 Rally assessed acquisition and matching systems with face masks



2021 Rally assessed acquisition and matching systems with face masks and system equitability

- Since 2018, the Rallies have demonstrated progress in the performance and maturity of biometric acquisition and matching systems
  - Rally results provide insights into how people interact with biometric systems to improve usability
  - Rally results have been used to inform participating vendors, leading to improved performance of both acquisition and matching systems
  - There are continuing challenges with respect to reliable image acquisition in the high throughput unattended use-case



Group Processing at Checkpoints (Concept):







## **2022 Rally Process**

## **Group Processing at Checkpoints (Testing):**

2022 Rally Station Configuration









## Efficiency

- All acquisition systems met the goal of 3 seconds or less and had faster per person transaction times for larger groups
- Quantified as average transaction time per group size per volunteer at each Rally Station





#### Most efficient:

Borah – 1.72 seconds per person for groups of 2,

**1.47 seconds per person for groups of 4** 



## **Effectiveness – Operational Focus**

- TIR: True Identification Rate: quantified as the percentage of users who were correctly identified
- (Correct Identifications / Total People)

	Acquisition System			
	Bison	Longs	Wilson	Borah
Kenai	97.4 <sup>●</sup>	96.5	93.2	74.1
Miami	97.4 <sup>●</sup>	96.5	93.2	74.1
Tioga	97.4 <sup>●</sup>	96.5	93.2	73.9
Mill	97.4 <sup>●</sup>	96.3	93.2	73.4
Bronx	97.0	96.3	93.0	73.6
Grant	97.4 <sup>●</sup>	96.0	93.0	73.0
Нор	96.9	95.8	92.8	73.7
Entiat	96.7	95.5	92.3	73.7
Flag	97.2	93.4	93.0	72.3
Row	83.7	83.8	79.2	62.4

Groups of 2

Matching System

		Acquisition System			
		Bison	Longs	Wilson	Borah
	Kenai	97.4 <sup>•</sup>	95.8	93.0	74.1
	Miami	97.4 <sup>●</sup>	96.0	93.0	74.1
	Tioga	97.4 <sup>●</sup>	96.0	93.0	74.1
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	Entiat	96.5	95.3	92.3	73.6
	Flag	97.4 <sup>•</sup>	94.3	92.6	72.7
	Row	81.3	84.0	79.2	59.8

Groups of 4

- Seventeen (17) system combinations met the TIR threshold of 95% for groups of 2 and 4
- Same system combinations across groups of 2 and 4
- No system combinations met the TIR goal of 99%



## **Effectiveness – Demographics**


- TIR performance was disaggregated into eight demographic groups
- Gender (self-reported)
  - Male, Female
- Race (self-reported)
  - Asian, Black, White
- Skin-Tone (measured)
  - Lighter, Medium, Darker





# Faces are different from other biometric modalities for (at least) two reasons

- Faces are genetic, iris and fingerprint characteristics are determined during development.
  - To us, individuals look more like their parents, siblings, and those that share racial and gender categories.
- Humans have an innate ability to perform face recognition tasks, not so with iris and fingerprints.
  - Humans have dedicated brain areas that process faces quickly
  - This was an important function for human evolution
    - Mates, Friends, Foes, Family members
    - Other primates have a similar capability
  - Intuitively perceive same-gender and same-race faces as more similar
  - We even know the exact part of the human brain dedicated to face processing.
    - Evolved to recognize familiar individuals within small social groups (25-100)
  - Prosopagnosia "face blindness"



Awakenings and A Leg to Stand On

VER SAC

and Other Clinical Tales

John C. Marchall. The New York Finner flood Review

ence from cognitive psychology (Yin, 1969; Bruce et al., 1991; us to study cortical specialization in the normal human brain with relatively bioh coatial resolution and large campling area Past




# Demographic Effects Exist, Our Understanding of Them may be Clouded.

#### > It may seem natural to us that face recognition "clusters" people based on race and gender <

### Iris recognition









Iris recognition false positives were random relative to race and gender

### Face recognition









80% of face recognition false positives were between people of the same race and gender

Subjects consent for use of their image in publications was obtained




## **Apples and Apples or Apples and Oranges?**


> All of these "errors" are called "false matches", but those on the right are different than those on the left <</p>

#### Iris recognition









Iris recognition false positives were random relative to race and gender

#### Face recognition









ience and Technology


80% of face recognition false positives were between people of the same race and gender


Subjects consent for use of their image in publications was obtained

## This is (likely) (currently) a Universal Feature of Face Recognition

race, gender, and age categories.


- We first highlighted this in 2019 using one commercial algorithm
- NIST subsequently confirmed this exists in all 138 algorithms
  - NIST FRVT Part 3: Demographics Annex 5.







## **Matching Focus Demographic Differentials**




When discounting failures to submit images of suitable quality, most system combinations were able to meet the 95% Rally matching-TIR threshold



## **Operational Focus Demographic Differentials**

- Some system combinations were able to meet the 95% Rally TIR threshold for all demographic group
- However, considering acquisition some demographic differentials remained
- Median system performance was:
  - Lower for "Male" relative to "Female" volunteers (gender differential)

Group Size	Female	Male
2	93.5%	92.8%
4	93.9%	92.0%






## **Operational Focus Demographic Differentials**

- Some system combinations were able to meet the 95% Rally TIR threshold for all demographic groups
- However, considering acquisition some demographic differentials remained
- Median system performance was:
  - Lower for volunteers that self-identified as "Asian" (race differential)

Group Size	Black	White	Asian
2	92.9%	92.5%	90.8%
4	91.3%	93.9%	90.8%






## **Operational Focus Demographic Differentials**

- Some system combinations were able to meet the 95% Rally TIR threshold for all demographic groups
- However, considering acquisition some demographic differentials remained
- Median system performance was:
  - Lower for volunteers with very dark skin tone and very light skin tone (skin tone differential)

Group Size	Light Skin Tone	Dark Skin Tone
2	93.1%	91.4%
4	94.1%	88.8%





## **Demographic Summary**

- When discounting failures to submit images of suitable quality, most system combinations were able to meet the 99% Rally match-TIR goal for all demographic groups
- Including failure to capture, some system combinations were able to meet the 95% Rally TIR threshold for all demographic groups
- Including failure to capture, demographic differentials in the number of systems able to achieve the 95% Rally TIR threshold were observed:
  - Lower for "Male" relative to "Female" volunteers
  - Lower for volunteers that self-identified as "Asian"
  - Lower for volunteers with darker skin tone



## Interactive Results Available at mdtf.org

- The data presented today is available for review and exploration at <u>https://mdtf.org</u>
- Interactive visualization of demographically disaggregated performance
- Downloadable PDF report with detailed performance metrics for each tested system

PLACEHOLDER: Video showing interactions with website infographics



## **ISO/IEC 19795-10: Demographic Differentials**

- DHS S&T is supporting development of standard methods of measuring demographic differentials:
  - ISO/IEC 19795-10 WD4 Biometric performance across demographic groups
  - How to define demographic groups, including skin-tone
  - How to plan and perform an assessment of demographic differentials
  - How to calculate & report error rates across groups



## **Questions & Answers**

- Contact information
  - peoplescreening@hq.dhs.gov
  - rally@mdtf.org
- Visit our websites for additional information
  - To see additional work DHS S&T supports, visit <u>www.dhs.gov/science-and-technology</u>
  - To view additional information about this year and prior Rallies, visit <u>https://mdtf.org</u>

