

U.S. Department of Homeland Security

SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY DIRECTORATE

Remote Identity Validation Technology Demonstration Webinar
Track 3: Presentation Attack Detection



Science and
Technology

Arun Vemury
Senior Advisor

Biometric & Identity
Technology Center

Richard Plesh
AI Scientist

Identity and Data Sciences Lab (IDSL)
at The Maryland Test Facility

Yevgeniy Sirotin
Technical Director

November 2024

Agenda

- Introduction
- Remote Identity Validation Technology Demonstration (RIVTD) Overview
- Track 3: Presentation Attack Detection (PAD) Overview
- Track 3: PAD Metrics
- Track 3: Active PAD Results
- Track 3: Passive PAD Results
- Summary & Conclusions



Biometric & Identity Technology Center

The Science & Technology Directorate (S&T) conducts foundational research to ensure advancements in science and technology are harnessed in the development of cutting-edge solutions to new and emerging operational challenges.

- ✓ Drive biometric and identity innovation at the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) through Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E) capabilities.
- ✓ Facilitate and accelerate understanding of biometrics and identity technologies for new, DHS use cases.
- ✓ Drive efficiencies by supporting cross-cutting methods, best practices and solutions across programs.
- ✓ Deliver subject matter expertise across the DHS enterprise.
- ✓ Engage industry and provide feedback.
- ✓ Encourage innovation across industry and academia.



Remote Identity Validation Technology Demonstration

- Industry has developed new tools to authenticate documents and verify the identity of users remotely:
 - Remote Identity Validation (RIV).
- Difficult for industry to test the effectiveness and fairness of these systems:
 - Hard to obtain large samples of bona-fide and attack samples.
 - Testing for demographic differentials is costly.
- S&T is studying the current performance of RIV to help industry to develop more secure, accurate and equitable technologies.

Remote Identity Validation Technology Demonstration

- S&T is evaluating component RIV technologies that are capable of:
 1. Assessing the validity of an identity document (U.S. driver's license),
 2. Matching a selfie to the photo on the identity document, or
 3. Assessing the "liveness" of the selfie.
- The demonstration has followed a phased approach, such that each of these steps in the RIV process is demonstrated in a separate track.



REMOTE IDENTITY VALIDATION TECHNOLOGY DEMONSTRATION



Science and Technology

Track 1: ID Validation

✔ ACCEPT ID

✘ REJECT ID



Dataset of over 1,000 genuine state ID card photos

Dataset of over 1,000 fraudulent ID card photos

Track 2: Selfie Match to Document

✔ VERIFY IDENTITY

✘ FAIL TO MATCH



Dataset of selfie photos and genuine documents from over 1,000 people

Over 1,000 mated comparisons

Over 500,000 non-mated comparisons

Track 3: Presentation Attack Detection

✔ ACCEPT SELFIE

✘ DETECT ATTACK



Tested with over 600 diverse bona fide users

Tested with over 1,200 presentation attacks



Track 3: Presentation Attack Detection Overview

Presentation Attack Detection Subsystems

- PAD subsystems differentiate between presentation attacks and bona fide users.
- Presentation attacks can be performed through use of various attack instruments.
- Two PAD subsystem types were in scope of RIVTD Track 3:
 - Passive PAD, and
 - Active PAD.




Active PAD user action:

- Turn / Rotate head, blink, etc.


Active PAD hardware action:

- On-board cameras, sensors, etc.




Bona Fide Volunteer Demographics

- RIVTD Track 3 bona fide data collection:
 - 661 volunteers.
 - Presented to active PAD subsystems.
 - Acquired “selfie” images & videos.
- Demographics:
 - Age (self-reported),
 - Gender (self-reported),
 - Race (self-reported), and
 - Skin-Tone (measured).



Active PAD: Bona Fide Demonstration Process



Passive PAD: Bona Fide Demonstration Process

- Acquired dataset of “selfie” images and videos.
- Images captured in a standard environment in front of a gray background:
 - Users were asked to maintain a neutral expression and hold the smartphone straight.
 - Selfie videos are 10 seconds long – no special actions requested from user.
- Images and video were acquired using iPhone 14, Samsung Galaxy S22, and Google Pixel 7 smartphones:
 - Images were JPEG or PNG.
 - Videos were MOV or MP4.



Volunteer shown consented to have their images used in government presentations.



Presentation Attack Instruments

Class A	Class B	Class C
<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Printout on Paper• Display on Screen	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Paper Masks• Video Replay on Screen	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Attacks requiring special hardware and significant effort/cost to perform

The number and specific species of PAIs will not be disclosed.

Subsystem Requirements

- Implement the MdTF active or passive PAD Application Programming Interface.
- No outside functionality and no access to the internet.
- Target a 1% Bona fide Presentation Classification Error Rate (BPCER).




Application and Selection Process

- All RIVTD Track 3 applications were evaluated by a panel of experts.
- PAD subsystems:
 - 8 active subsystems applied → 6 active subsystems selected.
 - 17 passive subsystems applied → 15 passive subsystems selected.
 - Representative of industry state of the art.
- Each subsystem was given a unique alias:
 - Passive: PAD-P1, PAD-P2, ...
 - Active: PAD-A1, PAD-A2, ...

Track 3: Presentation Attack Detection Metrics


Active PAD: Efficiency and Satisfaction

- Efficiency:
 - Average Transaction Time.
 - The average time users spend interacting with the subsystem.
 - Benchmark: Below 30 seconds.
- Satisfaction:
 - Positive Satisfaction Rate.
 - The proportion of volunteers positively satisfied after interacting with the subsystem.
 - Benchmark: Above 90%.



Passive PAD: Efficiency

- Efficiency:
 - Average Run Time.
 - The time taken to process a biometric sample.
 - Benchmark: Below 5 seconds.



Bona Fide Presentation Classification Error Rate (BPCER)

- BPCER: The proportion of bona fide presentations that are incorrectly classified as presentation attacks.
 - In this evaluation, PAD subsystem providers were required to target a 1% BPCER.
 - Benchmark: Below 3%.
- BPCER (Max): The maximum BPCER across tested smartphones.
- Errors (non-responses) interpreted as “attack detected” response.
 - Failure is suspicious policy: In a bona fide scenario, non-responses contribute to BPCER.

Attack Presentation Classification Error Rate (APCER)

- APCER: The proportion of attack presentations using a given PAI species that are incorrectly classified as bona fide.
 - Benchmark: Below 3%.
- APCER (Class): The maximum APCER across species in a particular PAI class.
- APCER (Max): The maximum APCER across tested species and smartphones.
- Errors (non-responses) interpreted as “attack detected” response.
 - Failure is suspicious policy: In an attack scenario, non-responses do not contribute to APCER.

Track 3: Active PAD Results


Active PAD: Efficiency and Satisfaction

- Efficiency:

- Average transaction time.
- Time to complete interaction with subsystem.
- Range: 22.7 s to 39.6 s.
- PAD-A1 and PAD-A4 consistently met the 30 s efficiency benchmark.
- 5/6 subsystems were faster on iPhone.


- Satisfaction:

- Positive satisfaction rate.
- Proportion of volunteers positively satisfied with app after interaction.
- PAD-A1 consistently met the 90% satisfaction benchmark.
- No consistent trends by operating system.




Active PAD: Bona Fide Classification Error Rate (BPCER)

- BPCER:
 - The proportion of bona fide presentations that are incorrectly classified as presentation attacks.
 - Lower equals greater convenience.
- No active subsystem met the 3% error benchmark.
- BPCER difference across smartphones:
 - Max: 14%
 - Median: 5%



Active PAD: Attack Presentation Classification Error Rate (APCER)

- APCER (Class):
 - The maximum APCER of all the species present in a particular PAI class.
 - Lower equals greater security.
- PAD-A1 and PAD-A3 successfully rejected all attacks.
- APCER (Class) difference across smartphones:
 - Max: 30%.
 - Median: 0%.




Attack Class Effect	Class A	Class B	Class C
Description	Printout on Paper Display on Screen	Paper Masks Video Replay on Screen	Attacks requiring special hardware and significant effort/cost to perform
APCER (Class) < 3%	10/12 System Combinations	6/12 System Combinations	6/12 System Combinations
Max Error:	30%	32%	37%

- Met benchmark with all 3 PAI classes
- ◐ Met benchmark with 1-2 PAI classes
- Did not meet benchmark

Active PAD: BPCER Differential Performance


- Active PAD subsystems made more errors for older people.
 - 10/12 active PAD system combinations had substantially higher BPCER for older volunteers.
 - Up to 48% BPCER difference.
- Differential performance based on gender, race, and skin tone was not consistently observed across active subsystems.



Track 3: Passive PAD Results


Passive PAD: Efficiency

- 11/15 subsystems consistently met the 5 s efficiency benchmark.
- Video-input systems were substantially slower relative to image-input systems.
 - Image-input system combinations: 0.2 seconds to 3.7 seconds to process a still image.
 - Video-input system combinations: 6.5 seconds to 27.5 seconds to process a 10 second video clip.
- Smartphone effect on efficiency:
 - Fastest on average: iPhone 14
 - Slowest on average: Samsung Galaxy S22



Passive PAD: Bona Fide Classification Error Rate (BPCER)


- BPCER:
 - The proportion of bona fide presentations that are incorrectly classified as presentation attacks.
 - Lower equals greater convenience.
- 9/15 passive subsystems met the 3% BPCER benchmark (for all smartphones).
- BPCER difference across smartphones:
 - Max: 8.6%
 - Median: 0.3%



Passive PAD: Attack Presentation Classification Error Rate (APCER)


- APCER (Class):
 - The maximum APCER of all the species present in a particular PAI class.
 - Lower equals greater security.
 - Benchmark set at 3% error.
- PAD-P1 and PAD-P9 successfully rejected all attacks.
- APCER (Class) difference across smartphones:
 - Max: 52%
 - Median: 6%

Attack Class Effect	Class A	Class B	Class C
Description	Printout on Paper Display on Screen	Paper Masks Video Replay on Screen	Attacks requiring special hardware and significant effort/cost to perform
APCER (Class) < 3%	21/45 System Combinations	17/45 System Combinations	14/45 System Combinations
Max Error:	88%	98%	100%



Passive PAD: BPCER Differential Performance

- Across different passive systems, demographic differentials in BPCER were not consistent with respect to age, gender, race or skin tone.
- Age:
 - 1/15 subsystems higher error for 46+.
- Gender:
 - 1/15 subsystems higher error for Female
 - 2/15 subsystems higher error for Male.
- Race:
 - 1/15 subsystems higher error for Black.
 - 2/15 subsystems higher error for White.
- Skin tone:
 - 2/15 subsystems higher error for T1 (dark skin).
 - 2/15 subsystems higher error for T3 (light skin).



Summary & Conclusions

Active PAD: Results Summary

- **BPCER:**
 - No active subsystem met the 3% BPCER benchmark.
- **APCER:**
 - PAD-A1 and PAD-A3 subsystems detected all attempted attacks.
 - No other active subsystems met the 3% APCER (Max) benchmark.
- **Efficiency (Average Transaction Time):**
 - PAD-A1 and PAD-A4 met the 30 s benchmark.
- **Differential Performance:**
 - 5/6 subsystems had significant differential performance in BPCER with respect to age.

PAD-A	1	2	3	4	5	6
BPCER (Max)	12.9%	58.6%	17.0%	11.4%	41.5%	6.1%
APCER (Max)	0.0%	6.7%	0.0%	36.7%	31.7%	23.3%
Satisfaction (Min)	91%	77%	78%	87%	70%	89%
Average Transaction Time (Max)	28s	40s	33s	27s	34s	32s

Legend

X	Met Benchmark	X	Did Not Meet Benchmark
---	---------------	---	------------------------

* “Max” and “Min” is used to find worst-case values for each metric over all tested attack types and devices.

Passive PAD: Results Summary

- BPCER:
 - 9/15 subsystems met the 3% BPCER benchmark.
- APCER:
 - PAD-P1 and PAD-P9 detected all attempted attacks.
 - No other subsystems met the 3% APCER (Max) benchmark.
- Efficiency (Average Run Time):
 - All image-based, but not video-based subsystems met the 5 s efficiency benchmark.
- Demographic differentials:
 - No consistent trends across subsystems.

PAD-P	Image										Video				
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15
BPCER (Max)	16.0%	38.0%	0.5%	0.5%	0.3%	14.7%	0.0%	0.3%	8.5%	0.0%	2.1%	0.2%	0.2%	14.5%	31.9%
APCER (Max)	0.0%	21.7%	35.0%	96.7%	46.7%	3.3%	18.3%	3.3%	0.0%	98.3%	96.7%	100.0%	38.3%	5.0%	21.7%
Average Run Time (Max)	3s	1s	4s	<1s	<1s	<1s	2s	<1s	1s	2s	1s	22s	19s	28s	10s


Legend

X	Met Benchmark	X	Did Not Meet Benchmark
---	---------------	---	------------------------

* "Max" is used to find worst-case values for each metric over all tested attack types and devices.

Conclusions – Insights for PAD Providers

- Both active and passive PAD can be effective at detecting presentation attacks:
 - 2 active and 2 passive PAD subsystems detected all presentation attacks.
- Despite convenience focus of the demonstration, some subsystems sacrificed convenience for security:
 - Performance varied widely from the convenience target of 1% BPCER:
 - Active PAD tested BPCER (Max): 6.1% - 58.6%
 - Passive PAD tested BPCER (Max): 0% - 38%
- PAD subsystem performance can depend on the smartphone device.
- Active user interaction is a critical dependency of PAD and may introduce demographic differentials:
 - 5 of 6 active PAD subsystems had substantially higher BPCER for older volunteers.



Conclusions – Insights for PAD Customers

- **No subsystem met all** convenience, security, efficiency, and satisfaction benchmarks.
 - 6 Active subsystems and 15 passive subsystems demonstrated.
- Convenience and security varied substantially across subsystems.
 - Setting the systems up to achieve the target BPCER was challenging for PAD subsystem providers.
- **43% (9/21)** subsystems met convenience (BPCER) benchmark
 - Only passive met the benchmark (active subsystem BPCER included acquisition errors).
 - Passive PAD performance may be lower when acquisition errors are considered.
- **19% (4/21)** subsystems met security (APCER) benchmark
 - 2 active and 2 image-input passive.
 - Video-input did not have security benefits over image-input.
- **62% (13/21)** subsystems met efficiency benchmarks.
 - 2 active and 11 image-input passive (different benchmarks used for active/passive).
- **17% (1/6)** active PAD subsystems met the satisfaction benchmark.
 - Passive subsystems not tested for satisfaction.

Questions & Answers

- Contact information:
 - peoplescreening@hq.dhs.gov
 - rivtd@mdtf.org
- Visit our websites for additional information.
 - To see additional work DHS S&T supports, visit www.dhs.gov/science-and-technology.
 - For information about this and other DHS S&T technology evaluations, visit <https://mdtf.org>.

